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INTRODUCTION
Establishing a federal pleading standard is a high-stakes game for both
courts and prospective litigants. If the standard is too stringent, then courts
risk throwing out potentially meritorious claims and denying injured plain*
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tiffs any opportunity to be compensated for their losses. If the standard is
too lenient, courts risk being overloaded with frivolous lawsuits that expose
potentially innocent defendants to costly and burdensome discovery.
Defining the contours of the pleading standard implicates policy considerations and values at the core of our procedural system. When the merits of a complaint are unclear, do we err on the side of judicial accuracy by
allowing all plaintiffs the opportunity to uncover evidence in support of
their claims? Or do we err on the side of judicial efficiency and dismiss the
claim?
The Supreme Court threw federal pleading doctrine into flux with its
seminal decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.1 After officially “retir[ing]”2 the prevailing “no set of facts” standard for analyzing the factual
sufficiency of a complaint,3 the Court instituted a new requirement that a
complaint state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”4 Because the
Court did not provide a concrete definition of “plausibility,” however,
lower courts and scholars were confused regarding the intended scope and
content of the new standard.5
The Supreme Court recently attempted to clean up the Twombly mess
by revisiting the issue of general federal pleading standards in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.6 This Note conducts an empirical analysis to study whether the Court
has finally succeeded in creating a workable pleading standard that can be
applied uniformly across the circuits. This analysis first tracks whether
lower courts have cited the two-pronged analytical approach suggested by
Iqbal.7 Among the opinions that did cite the test, the analysis further examines whether the courts used each of the two prongs to analyze the suffi1

550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Id. at 563.
3
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
4
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
5
Some scholars and judges believed that Twombly instituted a heightened pleading standard for all
causes of action. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 432
(2008) (describing Twombly as “decidedly tighten[ing]” the federal pleading standard). Others confined
Twombly’s approach to antitrust cases. See, e.g., Kersenbrock v. Stoneman Cattle Co., No. 07-1044MLB, 2007 WL 2219288, at *2 n.2 (D. Kan. July 30, 2007) (“[Twombly] deals only with pleading
requirements in the highly complex context of an antitrust conspiracy case. It does not announce a
general retreat from the notice pleading requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).”); Lewis v. Marriot Int’l, Inc.,
527 F. Supp. 2d 422, 424 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (noting that the applicability of Twombly to non-Sherman
Act cases is “unknown”). A third group of scholars and judges argued that despite its explicit “retiring”
of the “no set of facts” standard, Twombly would have little practical effect on the outcomes of motions
to dismiss. See, e.g., EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)
(describing Twombly as imposing two “easy-to-clear hurdles” that plaintiffs must surmount); Robert G.
Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 889 (2009)
(“Understood relative to a baseline, Twombly’s plausibility standard should have only a minor impact on
notice pleading as a practical matter.”). For a more detailed discussion of the confusion surrounding the
Twombly decision, see infra Part I.C.
6
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
7
See infra Part IV.A.
2
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ciency of the complaint.8 Finally, the analysis identifies two potential definitions of plausibility that could be derived from the Iqbal opinion and
tracks which of these definitions is actually used in the opinions of lower
courts.9 By using these measures, this Note seeks to determine whether the
lower courts have articulated a consistent pleading standard in the wake of
Iqbal.
In light of the confusion created by Twombly, empirical work provides
valuable insight for litigants and scholars into how the Iqbal decision is actually affecting pleading practice. Indeed, three valuable, though preliminary, findings emerge from the sample of cases studied here. First, the
majority of courts have not even cited the two-pronged Iqbal test, let alone
applied it. Second, even those courts that have cited the test often did not
apply the first prong, which requires the separation of “conclusions of law”
from “factual allegations.” Finally, the majority of courts across almost
every circuit have adopted a “common sense” approach to evaluating plausibility, rather than relying on a “checklist approach,”10 which involves
matching the factual allegations in the complaint with each element of the
legal claim.
The study reveals that Iqbal had served as a judicial Rorschach test11
for lower courts, with each individual judge using the Court’s dicta to craft
the pleading standard that the judge feels to be most appropriate. Judges
who value judicial efficiency and judges who are sympathetic to defendants’ concerns about costly discovery have used the rigorous combination
of the two-pronged test and the checklist approach to plausibility to dismiss
claims they feel are frivolous. On the other hand, judges sympathetic to the
idea that, in close cases, courts should err in favor of providing plaintiffs
with their day in court have employed a more lenient standard by ignoring
the two-pronged test and defining plausibility as the application of “judicial
experience and common sense”12 to the facts presented in the complaint.
Either of these approaches represents a reasonable interpretation of Iqbal,
but they can yield dramatically different results for litigants. The results of
this Note’s analysis suggest that the Court’s effort to clarify federal pleading standards has failed, and that the Twombly and Iqbal opinions have ac-

8

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
10
See infra Part II.C (defining the “checklist approach” and the “common sense gloss”).
11
The Rorschach test, also known as the “inkblot test,” is a psychological test in which subjects’
perceptions of ambiguously shaped inkblots are used to examine the subjects’ personality characteristics
and emotional functioning. For an overview of the test, see ROBERT M. ALLEN, STUDENT’S RORSCHACH MANUAL 11 (1966); About the Test, INT’L SOC’Y OF THE RORSCHACH & PROJECTIVE
METHODS, http://www.rorschach.com/pages/rorschach-test/about-the-test.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2011). For a discussion of the theoretical foundation of the Rorschach test, see generally ALLEN, supra,
at 3–8.
12
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
9
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tually created more inconsistency in the federal pleading standards across
(and even within) the circuits.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the evolution of the
federal pleading standards. Part II analyzes the Iqbal opinion, identifying
the two distinct ways in which the Court attempted to clarify Twombly.
This Part also notes two different interpretations of “plausible” that one
could potentially synthesize from the sprawling dicta of the opinion. Part
III describes the empirical study, and Part IV presents and analyzes the results.
I. THE TWOMBLY MESS
Pleading standards are not merely a procedural hurdle that litigants
must surmount to proceed to discovery. On a deeper level, they reflect the
policy choices underlying our litigation system. Pleading standards recently shifted in response to concerns about increasing discovery costs and
crowded federal dockets, resulting in substantial doctrinal confusion among
lower courts and scholars.
A. Enactment of the Federal Rules and the Rise of “No Set of Facts”
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
courts and legislators failed to create a pleading standard that struck a stable
balance between judicial efficiency and adjudicative accuracy.13 During the
nineteenth century, legislators drafted pleading codes in an attempt to abrogate the rigid and esoteric common law pleading rules, which often caused
potentially meritorious claims to be dismissed due to technical deficiencies.14 Code pleading was premised on a single requirement: that plaintiffs
plead “facts” rather than “legal conclusions.”15 This distinction, however,
proved extremely difficult to apply in practice because a complaint could
very rarely present a coherent retelling of the events giving rise to the dispute without using some legal language.16 Courts were thus required to
draw an arbitrary line along a generality–specificity continuum.17 Although
13

See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749,
1753 (1998) (“[B]ecause pleading practice was littered with arcana, by the early nineteenth century it
seemed often to produce decisions entirely unrelated to the merits.”).
14
See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil
Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
1107, 1111–12 (2010) (explaining common law pleading and describing it as “a confining labyrinth of
formality”).
15
Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 862 (2010).
16
Id. at 863–64; see also Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 259,
260–68 (1926) (questioning the viability of the distinction between “law” and “fact”).
17
See Bone, supra note 15, at 864 (arguing that the distinction between legal conclusions and
factual allegations depends on the degree of factual specificity); see also Walter Wheeler Cook,
Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 421–22 (1921) (arguing that
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code pleading was intended “to promote greater clarity and uniformity in
pleading requirements, prevent unfair surprise to parties, and reduce
costs,”18 it ultimately failed to render the pleading process more accessible
to plaintiffs.19 As a result, adjudicatory accuracy was often compromised
because plaintiffs with meritorious claims were unable to navigate the complex and strictly enforced rules of the pleading process.20
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure discarded the unworkable fact–conclusion distinction and implemented a dramatically simplified pleading system.21 Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”22 Although Rule 12(b)(6) allows the defendant to file a motion to
dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” the
plain text of Rule 8 appeared to establish quite a low bar for plaintiffs. The
broad and permissive language of the new standard, which would come to
be called “notice pleading,” revealed an implicit value judgment by the
drafters of the rules that cases should be decided on the merits after an opportunity for discovery and that parties should not be barred from court
based on the pleadings.23
Despite its deceptively simple language, Rule 8(a)(2) contained some
significant ambiguities that required clarification by the courts. There was
no precise, objective understanding of what a “short” or “plain” statement
had to contain, or what a plaintiff had to do to “show[] . . . entitle[ment] to
relief.”24 The Supreme Court first attempted to articulate a workable pleading standard in Conley v. Gibson, declaring that a complaint should not be
dismissed at the pleading stage “unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”25 As commentators subsequently pointed out, the Court
might not have intended that lower court judges should apply this statement
literally and thus allow all but the most patently frivolous suits to proceed to
discovery.26 Rather, the standard was more logically viewed as a codificacourts “confuse[] ‘statements of evidence’ with what are really statements of the ‘ultimate facts’ but in
specific rather than in generic form”).
18
Schwartz & Appel, supra note 14, at 1114.
19
See id. at 1116.
20
See id. (“Thus, on balance, the Field Code left in place a system that still inhibited rather than
promoted the resolution of claims on the merits.”).
21
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . .”).
22
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
23
See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958) (“What
we require [in Rule 8] is a general statement of the case . . . . We do not require detail.”).
24
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
25
355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
26
See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (2010) (quoting
Twombly’s “retirement” of Conley’s “no set of facts” language to show the Court feared a focused and
literal reading of it).
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tion of one of the fundamental values of the federal procedural system: potentially valid complaints should not be thrown out because the plaintiffs
cannot allege all of the relevant facts prior to discovery.27
In the decades following the Conley decision, lower courts continually
attempted to impose heightened pleading standards for certain classes of
cases.28 Judicial concern over the rise in potentially frivolous civil rights
litigation led courts to require plaintiffs to plead facts, often relating to the
defendant’s state of mind, without first having the benefit of discovery.29
The Court rebuffed these attempts, however, emphasizing that the purpose
of notice pleading was the facilitation of a “proper decision on the merits.”30
By simplifying the initial stages of the litigation process, the Court ensured
that plaintiffs would have the opportunity to uncover evidence in support of
their claims even if those plaintiffs could allege little more than suspicious
activity prior to discovery.
B. Twombly and the Plausibility Standard
After a series of unequivocal affirmations of both Conley and the systemic importance of adjudicating claims on the merits after opportunity for
discovery,31 the Court appeared to have entrenched a very lenient pleading
standard. In 2007, however, the Court expressly “retire[d]” the venerable
“no set of facts” language from Conley, replacing it with a requirement that
a complaint be plausible, not merely probable.32 Twombly constituted a
substantial shift away from protecting plaintiffs’ interests in obtaining access to the discovery process and toward protecting defendants from the expenses associated with frivolous litigation.

27

See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986) (describing Conley as the Court’s “th[rowing] its weight
decisively behind the new liberal ethos” underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
28
See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165 (1993); see also Christopher M. Fairman,
The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003) (noting the tendency of some lower
federal courts to “impose non-Rule-based heightened pleading in direct contravention of notice pleading
doctrine”); Marcus, supra note 27, at 436 (“[F]ederal courts are insisting on detailed factual allegations
more and more often . . . .”).
29
Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 552 (2002); see also
Fairman, supra note 28, at 1011–59 (conducting a “micro-analysis” of pleading practices across
different areas of substantive law, including antitrust, CERCLA, RICO, negligence, and conspiracy).
30
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at
48).
31
See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (“The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting
point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”);
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168–69 (noting that under the current “notice pleading system,” federal courts
can use control of discovery and summary judgment, rather than heightened pleading requirements, to
weed out nonmeritorious claims).
32
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 563 (2007).
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly was a massive class action lawsuit filed
on behalf of all subscribers to local telephone and high-speed internet services from 1996 to 2007.33 The plaintiffs alleged that four of the nation’s
largest telecommunications companies (Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, or ILECs) had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act34 by conspiring to
restrain trade in two ways, both of which allegedly led to higher fees for local telephone and high-speed internet services.35 Aside from a general
statement made by the Chief Executive Officer of one of the ILECs, the
plaintiffs could offer no factual allegations showing the existence of such a
conspiracy.36 Instead, they asked the court to infer that the ILECs had entered into such an agreement based on the absence of any meaningful effort
by the ILECs to enter each other’s markets and the identical tactics ILECs
employed to undermine the upstart “Competitive Local Exchange Carriers”
(CLECs).37
The district court concluded that allegations of parallel business conduct did not adequately state a claim for conspiracy and subsequently dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.38 The Second Circuit
reversed.39 Echoing the seminal statement in Conley v. Gibson, the panel
reasoned that “to rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct
fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court would have to conclude
that there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the particular parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than
coincidence.”40 The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to address the

33

Id. at 550.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).
35
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. First, the plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs had “engaged in parallel
conduct in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth” of their competitors. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the complaint alleged that the ILECs had also conspired (and ultimately
pledged) to refrain from competing with each other by deciding not to expand beyond their regional
bases. Id. at 551.
36
The closest the plaintiffs came to evidence of a conspiracy was a statement by Richard Notebaert,
Chief Executive Officer of one of the ILECs, that encroaching upon the market of another ILEC “might
be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that doesn’t make it right.” Id. at 551.
37
Id. CLECs were communications companies founded after the 1984 divestiture of AT&T’s local
telephone services. Id. at 549. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996), imposed a host of duties on the ILECs, most of which were intended to facilitate the CLECs’
entry into the market for local telephone service. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549.
38
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated, 425 F.3d 99 (2d
Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544. The court reasoned that the defendants’ behavior could be fully
explained by the completely lawful and economically rational impulse to defend their original territories.
Id.
39
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 119 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added), rev’d, 550 U.S.
544.
40
Id. at 114 (emphasis added). The court acknowledged that while the complaint must state facts
that render a conspiracy plausible, “plus factors” showing more than parallel conduct (which is not
illegal under the Sherman Act) are not required at the pleading stage. Id.
34
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proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of
parallel conduct.”41
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, began the Twombly opinion’s
analysis by reiterating one of the fundamental tenets of federal pleading
practice: the longstanding Conley principle that a complaint need only provide “fair notice” to the defendant.42 Despite this initial nod to the governing precedent, however, the Court proceeded to alter its interpretation of
Rule 8(a)(2) dramatically. In Conley and its progeny, the Court based its
analysis of the factual sufficiency of the complaint on Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement of a “short and plain” statement,43 which implies that a plaintiff
need not supply much factual detail to survive a motion to dismiss.
By contrast, the Twombly majority focused on the Rule’s requirement
that claimants “show” and state the grounds for their entitlement to relief.44
Adequately doing so, the Court reasoned, requires the complaint to provide
some degree of factual detail beyond mere “labels and conclusions”; a
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”45
The Court emphasized the need to provide sufficient factual allegations to
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”46 The Court’s new interpretation stood in stark contrast to the earlier “no set of facts” standard,
under which a complaint should have been deemed sufficient if there was
any possibility that the allegations were true.
Recognizing the irreconcilable conflict between the “no set of facts”
language and its more stringent analysis of the Twombly complaint, the
Court dropped a bombshell. Justice Souter declared that, after nearly fifty
years of extensive use,47 the “no set of facts” phrase had “earned its retirement” and was “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may
be supported by any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”48 By doing so, the Court discarded the only language in the Conley
opinion that offered a serviceably specific standard by which lower courts
could assess the sufficiency of complaints.
41

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553. The narrow framing of the question presented might have been one of
the sources of judicial and scholarly confusion regarding the applicability of the plausibility standard to
all civil actions. See infra Part I.C.
42
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
43
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S 41, 47 (1957) (“[A]ll the Rules require is ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim’ . . . .” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
44
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
45
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
46
Id.
47
According to Westlaw’s KeyCite service, as of October 31, 2010, federal courts had cited Conley
v. Gibson 49,988 times.
48
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added).
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The Court, however, did provide a replacement standard: to survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.”49 Although Twombly concluded by reassuring lower courts (and litigants) that the new pleading standard did not
require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,”50 the opinion did not purport
to establish any concrete definition of “plausibility.” Rather, it provided
lower courts with only a few abstract statements describing what type of
complaint would not pass muster under the new standard. For example, a
plausible claim, as noted above, cannot be “speculative,”51 and a plaintiff
must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”52 Lower courts, however,
should not mistake plausibility for a probability requirement involving an
assessment of the likelihood that the suit would survive summary judgment
or succeed at trial.53 A valid complaint must simply provide enough facts to
“raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
[conduct].”54
Applying the new plausibility test, the Court reversed the Second Circuit,55 holding that facts alleging conscious parallel conduct without any
showing of agreement or conspiracy did not state a plausible claim for relief
under the Sherman Act.56 The Court did not, however, rest its decision entirely on the sufficiency of the facts contained in the complaint. Justice
Souter also noted the massive expenditure of time and money involved in
antitrust discovery.57 Requiring plaintiffs to provide facts plausibly suggesting conspiracy at the pleading stage would avoid inflicting on defendants
“the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably

49

Id. at 570.
Id; see also id. at 555 (“[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations . . . .”).
51
Id. at 555.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 556.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 553.
56
See id. at 548–49, 556.
57
See id. at 558. Any court that strictly construed the “no set of facts” language in Conley would
essentially be mandated to allow such a case to proceed to discovery, even if the allegations contained
therein were facially implausible. The Twombly Court feared that the lenient Conley standard, combined
with the threat of expensive discovery, would encourage defendants to settle “even anemic cases” early
in the litigation process. Id. at 559. The Court noted that the threat was obvious in the instant case, as
the plaintiffs represented a class consisting “of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or
high-speed Internet services” in the United States, the defendants were the country’s largest
telecommunications firms, and the antitrust violations allegedly occurred over the course of seven years.
Id.
50
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founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence to
support a § 1 claim.”58
Twombly did much more than change the standard for evaluating the
sufficiency of pleadings. On a broader scale, Twombly reflected a policy
judgment as to the appropriate ordering of the core values underlying the
pleading system.59 According to Conley and its progeny, the purpose of the
notice pleading standard, and the procedural system in general, was to facilitate judgments on the merits after all parties had the opportunity to uncover the full scope of the facts relevant to their cases.60 Twombly implied
that such an ideal is outdated under the modern realities of our legal system.
With the advent of enormous class action suits and the expansion of discovery costs, courts can no longer realistically hope to manage every case filed
in federal court.61 As a result, the Court implicitly elevated the goal of judicial efficiency and docket reduction over the goal of accurate adjudication
on the merits. By explicitly imposing a threshold screening requirement,
the Court now seemed willing to sacrifice a few potentially meritorious
claims to save defendants the cost of litigating the (presumably many)
frivolous ones. This policy choice reflected the heart of the historical debate surrounding pleading doctrine and enhanced its contemporary salience.

58

Id. at 559 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the district courts
could effectively regulate the discovery process, and it instead mandated that a safeguard be
incorporated into the federal pleading standard. Id. at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy
of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process
through ‘careful case management,’ given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.” (citation omitted)).
59
For discussions of the policy implications of the Twombly decision, see generally Bone, supra
note 5, which argues that a pleading requirement along the lines of Twombly’s plausibility standard
might be justified by a process-based theory of fairness; Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell,
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010), which argues that the Court
destabilized the entire civil litigation system without adequate warning or thought; Lonny S. Hoffman,
Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About
Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217 (2008), which argues that awareness of the
linkages between pleading, summary judgment, and removal law will lead to the establishment of
meaningful constraints on the exercise of judicial power in the pleading stage; Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic
and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a
Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604 (2006), which suggests a pleading
template that differentiates between three related but distinct pleading principles and defending Twombly
in terms of the proposed pleading template; Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed
Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, which argues that
courts should be more cautious when using the plausibility standard to dismiss employment
discrimination claims early in the proceedings; and Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation,
61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90 (2009), which argues that bifurcating pleading standards along cost-disparity
lines will curtail economic gamesmanship in civil litigation.
60
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
61
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
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C. Confusion in the Wake of Twombly
The Twombly opinion clearly abrogated the “no set of facts” standard
and replaced it with the requirement that a complaint state a claim for relief
that is “plausible on its face.”62 Courts and scholars were confused, however, regarding when and how the Twombly standard should be applied.
Some judges and scholars argued that the radical change in pleading standards applied only to the substantive area of antitrust law, or at most to discovery-intensive cases in general.63 These commentators pointed to the
narrow question presented in Twombly,64 the continued validity of the conclusory form complaints in the appendix of the Federal Rules,65 and the
Court’s short, per curiam opinion in Erickson v. Pardus,66 which was issued
two weeks after the Court decided Twombly. In Erickson, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s determination that the claim of a federal prisoner
was “too conclusory” to survive a motion to dismiss without mentioning the
plausibility standard established by Twombly.67 In fact, Erickson cited
Twombly to affirm the central tenet of notice pleading established by
Conley: the “short and plain statement” required by Rule 8(a)(2) “need only
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

62

Id. at 570.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Hanna Holdings, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 2d 404, 407 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (noting that
Twombly “required a heightened degree of fact pleading in an anti-trust case”). But see Kasten v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 09-11754, 2009 WL 3628012, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (referring to Twombly as
an “antitrust case” but explaining that Iqbal declared that the Twombly standard would “henceforth
apply to ‘all civil actions’”); Spencer, supra note 5, at 431 (declaring that “[n]otice pleading is dead”
after Twombly).
64
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548–49 (“The question in this putative class action is whether a § 1
complaint can survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major telecommunications providers
engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context suggesting
agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action.”).
65
For example, Form 11 allows the plaintiff to allege, in relevant part, that “On <Date>, at <Place>,
the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.” FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. The
plaintiff may alter the “drove a motor vehicle” element as well as the date and place. Forms 12 through
21 provide similarly sparse form complaints for various causes of action, including conversion of
property and patent infringement. These forms are rendered automatically valid by Federal Rule 84. As
the Twombly dissenters and subsequent scholars have pointed out, however, the crux of this complaint—
that the defendant drove “negligently”—is indisputably a legal conclusion. See Twombly, 554 U.S. at
576 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the bare allegation of “negligence” in the form complaint
suffices under the notice pleading standard, even though it would have been called a “conclusion of law”
under code pleading). See Ides, supra note 59, at 633 (“[I]t is difficult if not impossible to distinguish
between the supposedly sufficient ‘negligently drove’ allegation in [former] Form 9 [now Form 11],
where no specific facts of negligence are alleged, and the supposedly inadequate, ‘fact-deficient’
allegation of an antitrust conspiracy (or any other type of conspiracy) . . . .”).
66
551 U.S. 89 (2007). In Erickson, a federal prisoner filed a § 1983 claim alleging that prison
officials had acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id. at 90.
67
Id. at 94 (“The case cannot, however, be dismissed on the ground that petitioner’s allegations of
harm were too conclusory to put these matters in issue.”).
63
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upon which it rests.’”68 Some lower courts, unsure whether the Court intended Erickson to supersede or restrict the applicability of Twombly, reasoned that the preliminary requirement of plausibility should only be
imposed in certain cases, particularly those involving potentially costly or
time-consuming discovery.69
Not only were courts confused as to when Twombly should apply, but
they also struggled with the application of the standard itself.70 If a court
decided that Twombly provides the governing standard, how would it begin
to apply a test for plausibility? At most, Justice Souter’s opinion provided
guideposts by which the courts could determine what plausibility is not—it
is not a “probability requirement,” nor is it a requirement that a plaintiff
provide “detailed factual allegations.”71 But there is significant gray area
between a literal reading of the “no set of facts” standard and an outright
imposition of fact pleading. Some courts interpreted plausibility as imposing a heightened pleading standard,72 while others, relying on the Court’s
assurance that Rule 8 does not require a plaintiff to plead “in detail,”73 reasoned that the Court had not appreciably changed the pleading standard.74
68

Id. at 93–94 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56). Because the plaintiff in Erickson proceeded
pro se, however, it remained unclear how much impact the Court intended this opinion to have on
general pleading doctrine. See id. at 94 (“The Court of Appeals’ departure from the liberal pleading
standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2) is even more pronounced in this particular case because petitioner has
been proceeding, from the litigation’s outset, without counsel. A document filed pro se is ‘to be
liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” (citation omitted)).
69
See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e believe the Court is not
requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible ‘plausibility
standard,’ which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts
where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Ides, supra note 59, at 638–39 (arguing that the “rapidly prepared and issued
Erickson opinion” was issued as a “reassurance that the Bell Atlantic decision had not altered Rule
8(a)(2) pleading principles”).
70
See Jason Bartlett, Comment, Into the Wild: The Uneven and Self-defeating Effects of Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 89 (2009) (arguing that the plausibility
standard promotes disparate and inconsistent results).
71
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
72
See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 286–87 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (requiring that a
plaintiff essentially plead a prima facie case in order to avoid a motion to dismiss since the judge found
it was unlikely that, based on the complaint, the plaintiffs would ever be able to show no public benefit
from the defendants’ actions). See generally Bartlett, supra note 70, at 85–106 (describing the varying
interpretations of Twombly across courts).
73
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).
74
See, e.g., Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court
never said that it intended a drastic change in the law, and indeed strove to convey the opposite
impression; even in rejecting Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language, the Court does not appear to have
believed that it was really changing the Rule 8 or Rule 12(b)(6) framework.”); EEOC v. Concentra
Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2007) (interpreting plausibility as the reaffirmation of
the principle that plaintiffs may not disguise the nature of their claims).
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Empirical studies tracking the percentages of claims dismissed under
Conley and Twombly showed a slight but statistically significant increase in
the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted.75 Recently, Professor Patricia
Hatamyar conducted an empirical study that analyzed and compared dismissal rates under the Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal pleading standards.76
Her sample included 1039 cases, including approximately 440 from the
two-year period preceding Twombly, 422 from the two-year period after
Twombly, and 173 from the three-month period following the Iqbal decision.77 In coding the cases, she tracked the courts’ rulings and categorized
the cases based on the underlying area of substantive law.78 Her analysis
revealed a statistically significant increase in overall dismissal rates under
the Twombly and Iqbal standards,79 although motions that were granted with
leave to amend accounted for much of the increase.80
II. IQBAL AS JANITOR: CLEANING UP THE TWOMBLY MESS
The Supreme Court moved quickly to corral the confusion that arose
among the lower courts in the wake of Twombly. Less than two years after
it introduced the plausibility standard in Twombly, the Court clarified its interpretation of Rule 8(a) in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.81 The case resolved some of
most glaring ambiguities of the Twombly decision by establishing that the
plausibility standard applies to all civil cases82 and by precluding courts
from lowering the Rule 8(a) standard in favor of allowing limited discovery
on certain factual issues.83 More importantly, it offered two levels of guidance—“analytical” and “substantive”—to aid lower courts in determining
whether a complaint contains sufficient factual detail to survive a motion to
dismiss.
This Part analyzes the Iqbal decision. It begins with a brief description
of the facts and basic reasoning of the case. Second, it argues that Iqbal
makes two distinct contributions to pleading doctrine by providing both an
analytical and a substantive clarification of the plausibility standard. This
analysis forms the basis of the empirical questions analyzed in Parts III and
IV.
75

See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 601.
78
Id. at 590–93 (describing how Hatamyar categorized the cases in her sample).
79
Id. at 599.
80
Id.
81
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
82
Id. at 1953.
83
Id. In Twombly, the respondents proposed a plan of “phased discovery” limited to the issues of
alleged conspiracy and class certification. Justice Stevens cited this plan approvingly in dissent. See
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593–94 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. Background
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim brought a Bivens action84
against various federal officials—including then-Attorney General John
Ashcroft and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Robert
Mueller—related to his detention by the FBI during a post-9/11 investigation.85 The complaint alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller violated Iqbal’s
First and Fifth Amendment rights by designating him a “person of high interest” based on his race, religion, or national origin.86 The relevant part alleged the following:
[T]he Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . , under the direction of Defendant
MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part
of its investigation of the events of September 11. . . . The policy of holding
post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement
until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT
and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.87

The pleading described Ashcroft as the “principal architect” of the policy
and alleged that Mueller was “instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation,
and implementation.”88
Ashcroft and Mueller filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the claim
for failure to state sufficient facts to show their involvement in unconstitutional conduct.89 The district court, ruling on the motion before the Supreme Court decided Twombly, denied the motion under Conley’s lenient
“no set of facts” standard.90 The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal
with the Second Circuit, and Twombly was decided during the pendency of
that appeal.91 The Second Circuit affirmed in part the ruling of the district
court, reasoning that Twombly established a “flexible plausibility standard”
under which certain types of lawsuits (such as antitrust) require “amplification” of the factual allegations to render the claim “plausible.”92 Discrimination claims, it found, were not one of “those contexts” in which the law

84

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971) (holding that the violation of constitutional rights by a federal agent acting under color of his
authority gives rise to an action for damages).
85
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44.
86
Id. at 1944.
87
First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶¶ 47, 69, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV1809 (JG)(JA) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004), 2004 WL 3756442.
88
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
89
Id. In their response, the defendants pleaded the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Id. at
1942.
90
See id. at 1944.
91
Id.
92
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009).
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required additional factual specificity.93 In his concurring opinion, Judge
Cabranes requested that the Supreme Court address the issue of the appropriate standard in cases involving a defense of qualified immunity.94
Rather than confining its analysis to the narrower qualified immunity
issue, however, the Supreme Court used Ashcroft v. Iqbal as an opportunity
to clarify the general pleading standard on two distinct levels. On an analytical level, Iqbal established a two-pronged test for the application of the
plausibility standard. Meanwhile, it also provided a substantive clarification that sought to provide a positive explanation of what degree of factual
detail is necessary to render a claim “plausible on its face.”95
B. Analytical Clarification: Establishing a Two-Pronged Test for
Determining the Adequacy of a Complaint
This section describes Iqbal’s analytical clarification of the pleading
standard and presents the empirical questions used in Parts III and IV to
evaluate the success of the Court’s clarification. Iqbal’s first major doctrinal contribution consists of a two-pronged test designed to provide a concrete, accessible method by which lower courts could apply the rather
arcane plausibility requirement. At the outset of Iqbal’s sufficiency analysis, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, identified two “working principles” underlying the Court’s decision in Twombly.96 First, although a
court must accept all factual allegations as true for the purpose of a motion
to dismiss, it should not extend that tenet to legal conclusions.97 Second, a
complaint must state a “plausible” claim for relief to survive a motion to
dismiss.98 In articulating these principles, the Court noted that while Rule 8
certainly marks a “notable and generous” departure from the “hypertechnical” requirements of the prior code pleading regime, it “does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions.”99
Iqbal derived a two-pronged test from Twombly’s working principles
and suggested, rather than mandated, its application by lower courts. The
first prong says that “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”100 The second prong says
that once the court jettisons these legal conclusions, it must assume the veracity of the remaining well-pleaded factual allegations and “determine
93

Id. at 174.
Id. at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring).
95
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
96
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
97
Id. at 1949–50.
98
Id. at 1950.
99
Id.
100
Id. (emphasis added).
94
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whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”101 This test
represents Iqbal’s unique, positive contribution to pleading doctrine, as
Twombly did not endeavor to establish any rigid analytical framework
through which courts could assess the factual sufficiency of complaints.102
The test represented a major doctrinal shift because it transformed the
plausibility inquiry from a nebulous interpretive standard into a mechanistic
two-part inquiry that should theoretically lead to a more uniform application of the federal pleading standard. It instructed the lower courts as to
which type of legal allegations to disregard (“[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements”103)
and which type of facts to evaluate under the plausibility standard.104
But in the immediate aftermath of the Iqbal decision, have the lower
courts actually applied the new test? The permissive language of the opinion, specifically the recommendation that a court “can choose” to begin its
analysis of a pleading with the first prong of the test, means that the uniform usage of Iqbal’s analytical clarification is far from a foregone conclusion.
The first two questions posed in this Note’s empirical study related to
the application of the two-pronged test. How often do lower courts cite the
test in their summations of relevant pleading doctrine?105 And more importantly, if they do cite it, do they explicitly apply it in their opinions?106
These preliminary inquiries will give litigants and scholars some idea of
whether or not the lower courts find this analytical clarification of the plausibility standard to be a useful doctrinal contribution. Also, these empirical
101

Id.
Other scholars agree that the distinction between facts and conclusions departs sharply from the
Court’s reasoning in Twombly. See Bone, supra note 15, at 869. To be sure, the Court attempted to
couch the two-pronged test as virtually indistinguishable from the reasoning of Twombly, asserting that
in Twombly, the Court implicitly determined that the plaintiffs’ assertion of an unlawful agreement was a
“legal conclusion” and thus not entitled to an assumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Absent that
allegation, the complaint failed to pass the plausibility threshold because the telecommunications
companies’ actions were more likely explained by lawful, free-market explanations. Id. It is important
to note, however, that the Twombly court never differentiated between legal conclusions and wellpleaded facts. Rather, it analyzed the complaint holistically en route to a determination that the
defendants’ parallel conduct, assessed under the totality of the circumstances, did not seem suspicious.
The two-pronged test represented the majority’s interpretation of the reasoning behind Twombly, not a
reshaping or clarification of the expressed reasoning used to reach that holding.
103
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
104
The test itself does not clarify the “plausibility standard” but rather provides a framework
through which courts can apply the standard to the appropriate type of allegations. I argue that Iqbal
presents a further substantive clarification of plausibility by describing it in terms more accessible to
courts. See infra Part II.C.
105
See infra Part IV.A and Figure 1.
106
The “explicit application” question of this empirical study tracked whether courts designate
particular parts of the complaint as “legal conclusions not entitled to the assumption of truth,” as
suggested by the first prong of the test, before they evaluate the plausibility of the claim. See infra Part
IV.B and Table 1.
102
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measures will indicate whether the Iqbal decision has indeed helped the
lower courts move toward the uniform application of a pleading standard.
C. Substantive Clarification of Plausibility: The Checklist Approach
Versus the Common Sense Gloss
While Iqbal’s analytical clarification attempted to establish a uniform
method of application across the circuits, its “substantive clarification” of
the plausibility requirement sought to establish a more concrete standard
regarding how much detail a complaint must contain to “nudge[] [it] across
the line from conceivable to plausible.”107 The language of the opinion,
however, has given rise to at least two distinct but equally viable interpretations of the contours of plausibility. The first interpretation, which I refer to
as the “checklist approach,” suggests that each element of the legal claim
must be supported by factual allegations. The second, by contrast, suggests
that a complaint need only provide sufficient factual detail to trigger a
judge’s common sense determination that the defendant likely behaved
wrongfully. I call this interpretation the “common sense gloss.” This section discusses each of these interpretations in turn and explains how the
empirical portion of this Note evaluates which of these potential substantive
clarifications have been used by lower courts.
Iqbal strongly suggested that the level of plausibility of the complaint
is directly correlated with the level of factual detail provided by the plaintiff. The checklist approach to plausibility demands “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”108 Moreover,
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”109 While legal conclusions may provide the “framework” for the complaint, each of them “must be supported
by factual allegations.”110 The empirical portion of this Note tracks lower
courts’ citations of statements that are emblematic of the checklist approach
to determine whether courts are indeed assessing the plausibility of complaints by matching particular factual details to each element of the legal
claim.
On the other hand, the Court also seemed to endorse a “common
sense” gloss on plausibility. Certain statements in the Iqbal opinion urged
judges not to focus on the number of facts required but rather to use their
“judicial experience and common sense”111 to draw “reasonable inference[s]” regarding whether there was unlawful conduct afoot.112 In its initial description of the plausibility principle underlying Twombly, the Court
107
108
109
110
111
112

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Id.
Id. at 1950.
Id.
Id. at 1949.
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acknowledged that determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
is necessarily “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”113 A plausible claim
will contain facts that allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”114 This Note’s empirical
study also tracked judges’ citations of two representative descriptions of the
“common sense gloss” to determine the level of traction that this interpretation has gained among the district courts and to compare its use to that of
the checklist approach.
In most cases, application of the checklist approach and the common
sense gloss should lead to the same result, as a complaint generally must
contain more than conclusory allegations to trigger the judge’s common
sense determination that the defendant might indeed be liable for the alleged illegal behavior. At the margins, however, the two standards could
lead to different results. As other scholars have noted, the checklist approach might render certain types of claims, such as antitrust or employment discrimination, particularly susceptible to dismissal at the pleading
stage because, without discovery, plaintiffs would not be able to provide
sufficient factual support for all elements of their claims.115 If a judge uses
the common sense gloss, however, his visceral instinct that the conduct
reeks of wrongdoing would necessitate the denial of a motion to dismiss
even if the complaint did not provide facts supporting each element of the
claim. The potential divergence is particularly problematic in two types of
cases: (1) enormous class actions and other cases with high discovery costs,
like Twombly, in which courts might be motivated to impose a higher pleading standard to avoid burdensome discovery;116 and (2) civil rights cases,
which make up a disproportionately large percentage of the federal docket117
and which are sometimes already subject to threshold screening requirements.118
Thus, although Iqbal purported to offer substantive clarification of the
definition of “plausibility,” it instead created a type of judicial Rorschach
test. Courts can seize on one of two different definitions of the term, which
113

Id. at 1950 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Id. at 1949.
115
See Bone, supra note 15, at 878–79 (noting that civil rights claims and other cases involving
state-of-mind elements face disproportionately adverse effects under Iqbal); Seiner, supra note 59, at
1015 (arguing that courts should be more cautious in applying the two-pronged Iqbal test to employment
discrimination cases because the test often poses an insurmountable barrier for even meritorious suits).
116
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
117
See Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 604 (finding that civil rights cases overall comprise 44% of her
representative database of federal cases).
118
For example, plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis must survive a sua sponte motion to
dismiss. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (establishing that in proceedings filed by plaintiffs
proceeding in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted”).
114
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could result in markedly different results for certain types of claims. The
third empirical question addressed by this Note seeks to determine which of
the two interpretations of plausibility have gained the most traction among
the lower courts and whether there is any identifiable variability among the
circuits. Answering this question will help litigants draft claims that are
more likely to survive motions to dismiss (or to identify claims susceptible
to challenge at this stage). It will also help to direct scholarly attention to
the actual changes that Iqbal has wrought on our system so that further
study can spell out the implications of the Twombly–Iqbal standard.
III. HOW DISTRICT COURTS INTERPRET IQBAL
The empirical questions presented in this Note analyze which portions
of Iqbal judges choose to cite in their opinions. As my discussions of the
analytical and substantive clarifications make clear, Iqbal is, in some sense,
a judicial Rorschach test. In crafting their statements of the governing
pleading doctrine, judges pick and choose which statements to use (and
which statements to ignore) to define the relevant standard.
The empirical portion of this Note tackles three distinct questions.
First, this study measured whether federal district courts have cited the twopronged Iqbal test when they analyzed the factual sufficiency of complaints. Put another way, were they actually using the analytical clarification offered by the Court? Second, building on the first question, this study
measured whether the courts that did cite the two-pronged test explicitly
applied both elements of that test in their analysis of the complaint. In answering this question, the study asks whether the opinion articulated which
elements of the complaint were “legal conclusions” (and thus not entitled to
an assumption of truth) and which elements were “facts” subject to the
plausibility analysis of the second prong. If these courts were applying this
two-part analytical framework, then perhaps the Court’s attempt to clarify
its opinion in Twombly has indeed resulted in the application of a uniform
standard across all of the circuits.
While the first two questions pertain to the analytical clarification offered by the two-pronged test, the third question evaluates the substantive
clarification of the meaning of “plausibility.” Far from creating one readily
identifiable definition of plausibility, Iqbal offered multiple potential “clarifications” of the doctrine, ranging from a checklist approach resembling
fact pleading to a potentially more lenient common sense approach that
would enable suspicious but factually deficient allegations to proceed to
discovery. Because it is important for litigants to know the standard by
which courts will measure their complaints for plausibility, this study
tracked courts’ citations of four statements from the Iqbal opinion, two of
which encapsulate the checklist approach and two of which are emblematic
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of the common sense gloss.119 The goal of the third question, then, is to determine whether the substantive contours of plausibility, i.e., what a complaint must contain to survive a motion to dismiss, have remained constant
across district courts within the various circuits.
A. Contents of Sample
The study analyzed 10% of the federal district court cases that cited
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and were decided in the first six months following the establishment of the new test.120 The 10% sample size was large enough to
result in generalizable findings but still small enough to allow the level of
in-depth analysis of the decisions necessary to determine whether or not a
court “applied” the Iqbal test. A search on the commercial legal database
Westlaw indicated that Iqbal was cited 1592 times between May 18, 2009,
and November 18, 2009.121 Each circuit had equal proportional representation within the 196-case sample, which allowed me to assess whether the
application of the analytical and substantive clarifications varied by circuit.122

119

The two statements representing the checklist approach are (1) “While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1950, and (2) Rule 8 demands “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation,” id. at 1949. The two statements representing the common sense gloss are (1) “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” id., and (2) “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” id. at 1950.
120
Iqbal was decided on May 18, 2009, so I limited the search for district court cases to those
decided on or before November 18, 2009.
121
To arrive at this figure, I first searched for federal cases citing “Ashcroft v. Iqbal” and
“12(b)(6),” which yielded approximately 4100 cases. I then searched for cases citing “Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,” “12(b)(6),” and “pro se,” and subtracted those cases from the total. I did not include pro se
litigants in the empirical study because pro se complaints are assessed under a more lenient standard
than are complaints written by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Other
empirical studies tracking dismissal rates under the Twombly, Conley, and Iqbal standards also excluded
pro se plaintiffs from their data. See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 585 (excluding reviews of
complaints submitted with an application to proceed in forma pauperis), Kendall W. Hannon, Note,
Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6)
Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1832–33 (2008).
122
In this case, sampling by circuit is preferable to a completely random sample because the
number of cases citing Iqbal varies dramatically by circuit. For example, the Ninth Circuit cited Iqbal
401 times as of October 5, 2009, while the Tenth Circuit cited it only 80 times during the same period.
A 10% random sample of the entire body of cases citing Iqbal might have led to underrepresentation of
the smaller circuits. On the other hand, the “random” element might have caused the sample to swing
the other way and proportionally overrepresent them. Sampling by circuit prevented such skewing of
the data and allows for identification of trends within the different circuits.
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The study focused on district court cases123 and excluded circuit court
opinions because district court judges are “on the front line” of applying the
relevant standards.124 Their day-to-day applications of the test and its accompanying standards will determine the ultimate effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s attempt to clean up the Twombly mess. Put bluntly, the
district courts can render the Supreme Court’s efforts meaningless by simply declining to apply either, or both, of Iqbal’s purported clarifications of
the pleading standard. Moreover, while district courts are technically
bound by the opinions of their circuit courts, they are not directly supervised.125 Although a small percentage of cases might come before the circuit court and might be subject to reversal for their failures to undertake the
correct analysis,126 the vast majority of district court rulings represent the final say on a motion to dismiss.127
B. Method of Selection
I retrieved cases from Westlaw by conducting a “Citing References”
search, which returns all decisions citing a particular legal conclusion.
From there, I limited the results to federal district court cases and further
limited the cases by circuit. Within each circuit, I used a random number

123

This study used both reported and unreported opinions. Although the latter are not published,
their reasoning still provides guidance to the individual litigants as to the level of factual sufficiency
required to survive a motion to dismiss. As such, their reasoning is still valuable for purposes of
evaluating how the lower courts have interpreted Iqbal.
124
Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 584.
125
For example, the Third Circuit mandated the use of the two-pronged test in Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). The data in this study show, however, that lower
courts have been inconsistent in even citing the test, let alone rigorously applying it. See infra Part IV.
126
For example, according to a Westlaw “Citing References” search conducted on October 24,
2010, the Second Circuit had cited Ashcroft v. Iqbal 128 times. During the same time period, the district
courts within that circuit had cited Ashcroft v. Iqbal 1611 times. According to these figures, the Second
Circuit reviewed only 7.9% of the decisions citing Iqbal. Admittedly, this figure is a rather rough estimate of the number of decisions that receive appellate review at the pleading stage. The actual
percentage could be much smaller because most district court orders are never published. See
Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 584 n.198 (noting that, according to one estimate, only 3% of all district
court orders are available on Westlaw and Lexis). On the other hand, the actual figure could be larger
because the “Citing References” search did not account for the (potentially large) number of cases that
were pending review by the Second Circuit. The imprecision of the measurement does not, however,
undercut the more general point that it illustrates: the circuit courts review a relatively small percentage
of district court rulings on motions to dismiss.
127
It should also be noted that litigants are barred from appealing the denial of a motion to dismiss
by the Final Judgment Rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), unless they can show that their appeal falls within
one of the exceptions established by the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1946 (2009) (finding that the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss was
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it “turned on an issue of law and
rejected the defense of qualified immunity”).
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generator to select cases.128 Every state within each circuit is represented by
at least one opinion.129 All selections were made before I read the opinions.
As I read the selected opinions, I eliminated any cases that involved (1)
analysis of the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 9(b), which imposes a
fact pleading standard in cases of fraud or mistake;130 (2) analysis of a Rule
15 motion to amend the complaint;131 or (3) cases that cite Iqbal for purposes of discussing the doctrine of respondeat superior.132 I then selected
replacement cases using the random number generator.133
C. Analysis of the Sample
The first question addressed by the study was whether the lower courts
have cited the analytical clarification offered by Iqbal. After selecting the
cases, I checked each opinion for a reference to the two-pronged test.134
Cases that cited the test, either in full or in part, were coded “1.” Cases that
did not were coded “0.”
The second question of the study, whether courts have applied both
prongs of the analytical test, required a more in-depth reading of each case.
If the case cited the two-pronged test, I read the court’s opinion to determine whether or not the court had applied the test and then looked at the
court’s application of each prong individually. For the first prong, I looked
128

RANDOM.ORG, http://www.random.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (generating true random
numbers).
129
If the sample created by the random number generator did not include a representative of a
particular state, I discarded the last number on the list and generated a new one. I repeated this process
until all states were represented.
130
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
131
Id. 15(a). Although Rule 15(a)(2) urges courts to “freely give leave” to amend a complaint
“when justice so requires,” courts are not required to allow an amendment if doing so would be futile.
Many circuits define “futility” as an inability to satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard. See, e.g.,
Grant W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The
standard for assessing futility is the ‘same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under [Federal] Rule
[of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).’” (alteration in original) (quoting Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 155 (3d
Cir. 2000))); Riverview Health Inst. v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (“A
proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”
(quoting Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted))); Lucente v. IBM, 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002) (“An amendment to a pleading is
futile if the proposed claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).”).
132
See, e.g., Stanley v. Landers, No. 09-cv-52-PB, 2009 WL 2242676, at *8 (D.N.H. July 23,
2009).
133
Because these cases did count toward the total number of cases citing Iqbal (in the Westlaw
search), however, my sample might encompass slightly more than 10% of the cases citing Iqbal.
134
The specific quotation is as follows: “[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. . . . When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
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for an explicit delineation of some elements of the claim as “factual allegations” and some as legal conclusions “not entitled to the presumption of
truth.”135 If the court categorized some allegations as “conclusory” and thus
not entitled to the assumption of truth or if the court described certain allegations as “factual support” for the elements of the claim, I coded the case
“1.” If the court did not explicitly distinguish between “facts” and “legal
conclusions,” I coded the case “0.”
For the second prong, I looked for either a reference to a common
sense evaluation of the remaining factual allegations136 or an application of
the checklist approach wherein the court matched the remaining facts with
each element of the claim.137 If the court used either of these approaches to
evaluate the sufficiency of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, I coded the case “1”; if not, I coded it “0.”
The third question focused on the substantive clarification of the meaning of “plausibility,” measuring how often courts cited the checklist approach and the common sense gloss. The two statements representing the
checklist approach are:
(1) “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations”;138
(2) Rule 8 demands “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.”139
135

See id. For examples of courts applying the first prong, see, for example, Boy Blue, Inc. v.
Zomba Recording, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-483-HEH, 2009 WL 2970794, at *3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2009),
stating that “[t]hese allegations are simply sterile legal conclusions that are ‘not entitled to the
assumption of truth.’ Stripped of such legal incantation, these allegations provide no factual support for
the remaining elements . . . .” (citation omitted); United States v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, 639 F. Supp. 2d
326, 340–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), stating, “I approach that question by following the Iqbal protocol and first
identifying those allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
presumption of truth. . . . An example appears in ¶ 6: ‘Lloyds entered into a broad and ongoing
conspiracy with the primary goals of defrauding AremisSoft . . . .’”; and Estate of Allen v. CCA of Tenn.,
LLC, No. 1:08-cv-0774-SEB-TAB, 2009 WL 2091002, at *2 (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2009), noting that
“some allegations in the complaint are conclusory and not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
136
See, e.g., Natural Miracles, Inc. v. Team Nat’l, Inc., No. 09-cv-01379-WDM-KMT, 2009 WL
3234386, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2009) (“These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
easily support the inference that National disclosed Plaintiff’s formula to Nature’s Blend in violation of
the non-disclosure agreements and other legal duties.”); FTC v. Innovative Mktg., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d
378, 387 (D. Md. 2009) (“These allegations suggest that D’Souza was deeply involved in a closely-run
Enterprise, and permit the reasonable inference that D’Souza either had actual knowledge of the
unlawful conduct, or at least exhibited reckless disregard for the truth.”).
137
See, e.g., Dewey v. Lauer, No. 08-cv-01734-WYD-KLM, 2009 WL 3234276, at *4 (D. Colo.
Sept. 30, 2009) (“Because plaintiffs have alleged the nine elements of fraud, I find that they have
satisfied the first element of mail and wire fraud . . . .”); Fletcher v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No.
3:09CV284-HEH, 2009 WL 2067807, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 14, 2009) (“Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
falls short of plausibility, however, because it is devoid of any specific factual allegations that similarly
situated employees, who are not members of a protected class, received more favorable treatment . . . .”).
138
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
139
Id. at 1949.
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The two statements representing the common sense gloss are:
(1) “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”;140
(2) “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense.”141

Citations of each of these statements were tracked separately. A case was
coded as “1” if it quoted one of the statements and “0” if it did not.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
The data lead to three distinct conclusions. First, the majority of courts
did not even cite, let alone apply, the two-pronged test offered by Iqbal.
Second, among the courts that did cite the two-pronged test, the majority
did not explicitly apply the first prong of the test in their analysis of the sufficiency of the complaint. Finally, courts cited the common sense gloss on
the plausibility standard much more often than they cited the checklist approach. This Part discusses the results supporting each of these findings
and then presents a normative analysis of the implications of each.
A. Lack of Consistent Use of the Two-Pronged Test
To say that the Iqbal test has been inconsistently utilized might be a bit
of an understatement. Overall, less than 50% of the district court cases in
the sample cited the two-pronged Iqbal test.142 When the data were broken
down among the circuits, most of the data points fell within the 30%–40%
range. Only the Fourth and Tenth Circuits cited the test in more than 50%
of the sampled cases.143 At this early stage, it appears that Iqbal has only
generated more confusion over pleading standards because it proposed a

140

Id.
Id. at 1950. Each of these four statements comes from a different paragraph in the opinion.
142
To be clear, every case in the sample cited to some portion of the Iqbal decision. See supra Part
III.B (explaining method of case selection). The 50% of cases that did not cite the two-pronged test
cited different elements of the Court’s explanation of the pleading standard, including the four
statements tracked in question three of this study. See infra Part IV.C.
143
Professor Hatamyar’s study contains an offhand mention that only a few cases in her database
cited the two-pronged test, but her study did not explicitly track this data. See Hatamyar, supra note 75,
at 582 (“Perhaps I am magnifying the importance of the ‘two-pronged approach.’ Only a minority of
district courts citing Iqbal in the Database I constructed even mentioned the ‘two-pronged approach.’”).
Hatamyar’s study did not, however, focus on which portions of the Iqbal opinion were relied upon by
lower courts. She focused instead on tracking dismissal rates across various areas of substantive law
under the Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal standards. See id. at 589–96 (describing how Hatamyar coded the
cases in her database).
141
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test that has been cited by less than half the circuits and has been rigorously
applied by an even smaller fraction.144
FIGURE 1: BAR GRAPH OF PERCENTAGE OF CASES CITING TWO-PRONGED
TEST

All Circuits
1st Circuit
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This reluctance to apply the test might change over the coming months
(or even years), particularly if circuit courts choose to endorse the test. By
November 2009, the last month covered by this study’s sample, all but one
of the circuits had issued opinions that analyzed the Iqbal standard at
length.145 However, only the Third Circuit mandated the use of the twopronged test by lower courts.146 Although it never explicitly ordered district
courts to apply the test, the Fourth Circuit implicitly endorsed the twopronged approach by citing and applying it in two of its decisions.147 Two
other circuits have issued mixed messages, citing and applying the twopronged test in at least one opinion while relying solely on the common

144

See infra Figure 1. Often, cases simply cited the test at the outset and made no further mention
of either separating and discarding legal conclusions or determining the plausibility of the remaining
facts. See infra Part IV.B.
145
The First Circuit did not issue its first analysis of the Iqbal pleading standard until December
2009. See Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 48–51 (1st Cir. 2009). The court described the twopronged test as a “suggested” approach. See id. at 49.
146
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).
147
See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256–60 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citing and stringently applying the two-pronged test); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193–97 (4th
Cir. 2009) (citing and applying the two-pronged test without mentioning the “common sense” gloss).
The Tenth Circuit cited the two-pronged test but noted that the Supreme Court had merely “suggested”
that lower courts follow this approach. See Hall v. Witteman, 584 F.3d 859, 863 (10th Cir. 2009).
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sense gloss in one or more other opinions.148 The remaining circuits have
not mentioned the two-pronged test and have simply relied on the common
sense definition of plausibility to guide their decisions.149
Moreover, it is unclear exactly how much impact circuit court mandates actually have on district court judges. For example, in an opinion issued on August 18, 2009, the Third Circuit clearly told district courts that
they “should” apply the two-pronged Iqbal test whenever they were called
to analyze a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.150 Within the
Third Circuit sample, my study analyzed eleven district court cases decided
more than ten days after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion.151 Of these
cases, only five cited the test, and only one rigorously applied it.152
Although circuit decisions might technically be binding on the district
courts, lower court judges have a long history of recalcitrance in applying
the pleading standards designated by appellate courts. Leatherman v. Tarrant County and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema are the best illustrations of this assertion: both cases involved district court judges imposing an artificially
heightened pleading standard that streamlined the adjudicatory process by
weeding out obviously unmeritorious claims at the earliest possible stage.153
The reverse seems to have happened with Iqbal; now that the pendulum of
the Supreme Court’s pleading jurisprudence has swung in the opposite direction, district courts may fear that a stringent application of the Iqbal test
would freeze out potentially meritorious claims. Interestingly, by reverting
to a more lenient pleading standard, the courts are acting against their own
interest in reducing their dockets. The Supreme Court has handed district
148

Within the Second Circuit, compare Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010),
which describes the two-pronged test as “suggested,” with Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir.
2009), which does not cite the two-pronged test. In the Fifth Circuit, compare Rhodes v. Prince, 360 F.
App’x 555, 558–60 (5th Cir. 2010), which cites and applies the two-pronged test, with Floyd v. City of
Kenner, 351 F. App’x 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2009), which cites the “reasonable inference” standard only.
149
See Waters Edge Living, LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., 355 F. App’x 318, 323 (11th Cir. 2009);
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009); Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc.,
579 F.3d 603, 609–11 (6th Cir. 2009); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir.
2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Brown v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
334 Fed. App’x 758, 759 (7th Cir. 2009); Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
150
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210–11.
151
I omitted one case decided on August 20, 2009, on the assumption that the court had already
drafted its opinion before the Third Circuit issued its decision. This case neither cited nor applied the
Iqbal test. See Scholz Design Inc. v. Skatell, No. 09cv0896, 2009 WL 2595660 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20,
2009).
152
Goldsmith Assocs. v. Del Frisco’s Rest. Grp., No. 09-1359, 2009 WL 3172752, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 1, 2009) (“Goldsmith’s allegations related to whether the defendant’s enrichment was ‘unjust’
constitute the sort of ‘legal conclusion’ or ‘naked assertion’ that must be disregarded under Iqbal. . . . In
order to avoid dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, Goldsmith must allege in its complaint facts
showing that the defendants specifically requested benefits or misled Goldsmith.”).
153
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165 (1993).
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court judges a massive club with which to pummel all complaints that lack
sufficient factual support at the pleading stage, and they have instead chosen to use a scalpel to carve out only those claims that are facially implausible or profoundly lacking in factual support.
Assuming that this infrequent use of the two-pronged test represents
the beginning of a long-term trend rather than a bit of initial recalcitrance,
one must ask why district courts would choose not to apply it. One obvious
reason is that the test, in practice, might result in overly aggressive screening at the pleading stage.154 Perhaps the district courts aptly recognize that
the two-pronged test potentially screens out claims that seem facially suspicious but cannot provide much more than an unadorned accusation because
the plaintiffs do not have access to the requisite information prior to discovery. As some scholars have noted, allowing the district courts the flexibility
to infer potential wrongdoing is absolutely essential to facilitate enforcement of some areas of underlying substantive law.155 In particular, enforcement of employment discrimination, constitutional civil rights, and
conspiracy claims would be particularly difficult if courts insisted on disregarding all legal conclusions at the outset.156 If the trend of inconsistent application of the test does continue, the question of whether the use of the
test varies according to the underlying substantive law would be a worthwhile subject for a future empirical study.
B. Courts’ Failures to Apply Prong One of the Iqbal Test
The second finding also illustrates that Iqbal’s analytical clarification
of the pleading standard—its two-pronged test—has not succeeded in instituting a uniform analytical method for evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings. The first prong of the Iqbal test requires the court to separate “legal
conclusions” from “factual allegations,” whereas the second step involves
an analysis of the plausibility of the remaining “factual allegations.”157 The
data show that even when courts cited the two-pronged test, they often did
not apply the first prong in their opinions. Only 51.67% (31 out of 60) of
the district court opinions that cited the Iqbal test expressly designated cer-

154

Judge Alsup opined that “[a] good argument can be made that the Iqbal standard is too
demanding. Victims of discrimination and profiling will often not have specific facts to plead without
the benefit of discovery. District judges, however, must follow the law as laid down by the Supreme
Court.” Ibrahim v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2009 WL 2246194, at *10 (N.D.
Cal. July 27, 2009).
155
See Seiner, supra note 59, at 1043 (proposing a new analytical framework for employment
discrimination claims to allow plaintiffs the requisite latitude to allege intent).
156
See Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 607 (finding that the percentage of Rule 12(b)(6) motions
granted in overall civil rights cases grew from 50% under Conley to 53% under Twombly to 58% under
Iqbal); Hannon, supra note 121, at 1837 fig.3 (showing an increase in the grant and denial rates of
12(b)(6) motions in civil rights claims during the time between the Conley and Twombly cases).
157
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). See supra Part IV.A.
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tain elements of the claim as “facts” and others as “conclusions” for purposes of conducting the subsequent plausibility analysis.
TABLE 1: CASES CITING AND APPLYING TWO-PRONGED TEST BY CIRCUIT
Total
Cases

Citing TwoPronged Test

Applying
Prong One

Applying
Prong Two

All Circuits

159

73 (45.91%)

30 (18.87%)

37 (23.27%)

1st Circuit

8

3 (37.50%)

2 (25.00%)

4 (50.00%)

2nd Circuit

25

9 (36.00%)

5 (20.00%)

5 (20.00%)

3rd Circuit

21

8 (38.10%)

4 (19.04%)

3 (14.29%)

4th Circuit

11

9 (81.81%)

3 (27.27%)

6 (54.55%)

5th Circuit

12

4 (33.33%)

1 (8.33%)

1 (8.33%)

6th Circuit

13

4 (30.76%)

0 (0.00%)

1 (7.69%)

7th Circuit

14

6 (35.71%)

4 (28.57%)

4 (28.57%)

8th Circuit

5

1 (20.00%)

0 (0.00%)

0 (0.00%)

9th Circuit

26

12 (46.15%)

4 (15.38%)

4 (15.38%)

10th Circuit

8

6 (75.00%)

3 (37.50%)

3 (37.50%)

11th Circuit

12

5 (41.67%)

3 (25.00%)

5 (41.67%)

D.C. Circuit

4

1 (25.00%)

1 (25.00%)

1 (25.00%)

The observed lack of rigor is likely attributable to a number of factors.
First (and perhaps foremost), after two years of struggling with Twombly,
judges have likely become accustomed to applying the plausibility standard
in a holistic manner. This approach allows the judge to read the complaint
as a coherent retelling of the events underlying the dispute rather than as a
laundry list of individual factual allegations carefully isolated from legal
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language.158 Rigid application of the first prong might actually undermine
the court’s ability to apply the second, as the removal of the “legal conclusions” linking together the events in question might leave the judge with an
incomplete picture of the events. For judges who adjudicate motions to
dismiss on a regular basis and who have already become comfortable with
assessing the plausibility of the entire complaint, the imposition of an additional analytical step likely seems both burdensome and unhelpful.159
Moreover, judges have likely always tacitly disregarded at least the
baldest conclusory assertions. The empirical data from studies of Twombly
have repeatedly shown that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal rates under Conley are
higher than one might expect if courts were applying the “no set of facts”
standard literally.160 For example, one study found that courts citing Conley
as the governing pleading standard dismissed 36.8% of the 2212 sampled
claims.161 The courts issued mixed rulings (granted-in-part and denied-inpart) in another 29.1% of the sampled cases.162 These studies suggest that
pleading has always served as a preliminary gatekeeper to weed out potentially frivolous claims.163 Indeed, courts have long recognized that even the
more lenient notice pleading standard was not intended to allow inherently
dubious allegations to proceed to discovery simply because the plaintiff
could dream up some scenario in which the defendant would be liable.164
Perhaps lower courts have interpreted the first prong of the Iqbal test as a
mandate to continue to conduct the same level of preliminary screening.
The much-maligned first prong of the Iqbal test is not helped by the
fact that it is incredibly difficult to apply in a principled, formalistic manner. The Iqbal decision itself fails to offer a cogent explanation of why certain allegations in the complaint were “conclusory” while others were not.165
158

Bone, supra note 15, at 868–69.
Professor Bone agrees and argues that the second prong should be the only component of the
plausibility test. See id. at 869.
160
See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 601 tbl.2 (finding that out of 444 cases citing Conley, 215
were dismissed and 123 received mixed holdings).
161
Hannon, supra note 121, at 1835.
162
Id.; see also Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 601 tbl.2.
163
See Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 599 (finding, in an empirical analysis of a representative sample
of federal cases, that courts using the Conley standard granted nearly half (46%) of all motions to
dismiss); Hannon, supra note 121, at 1835.
164
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (“[A] good many judges and
commentators have balked at taking the literal terms of the Conley [‘no set of facts’] passage as a
pleading standard.”); Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that the
“exceedingly forgiving attitude toward pleading deficiencies” embodied by Conley v. Gibson “has never
been taken literally”).
165
Bone, supra note 15, at 859–62. The Court dismissed as conclusory the complaint’s allegations
that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the discriminatory policy and that Mueller was
“instrumental” in its adoption and execution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009). These
are not, however, “legal conclusions” in the traditional sense, particularly when compared to the other
allegations that the defendants “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject”
Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement based on his race, religion, or national origin. Id. The latter
159
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Scholars have rather cynically posited a reason for that logical omission—
no principled way exists to establish a threshold level of specificity that an
allegation must reach to be afforded a presumption of truth.166 The “conclusory” nature of an allegation can only be determined in the context of a particular case,167 and a judicial determination that a particular allegation is
“conclusory” can be decisive.168 Courts might be uncomfortable applying
this difficult test to a decision (dismissal of a pleading) with such high
stakes for both parties.
Moreover, the “law–fact” distinction was the central reason that the
drafters of the Federal Rules discarded code pleading in favor of the more
lenient and accessible standard of Rule 8(a)(2).169 Now, however, the Iqbal
majority appears to have written that hazy distinction back into federal
pleading standards. It is no surprise that courts have been reluctant to embrace it. While it might be relatively easy to toss out an allegation of “negligence” or “recklessness,” at the margin, the difference is best viewed on a
continuum rather than as a bright line, formalistic determination.170
One cannot blame a district court for not wanting to wade into this
mess. When faced with one of these marginal cases, the more prudent
course appears to involve steering clear of the first prong of the Iqbal test
and relying upon the more holistic plausibility approach undertaken by the
Twombly court. This allows the court to evade the equally unattractive options of either providing tortured reasoning to explain its decision to disregard certain elements as “conclusory” or providing no reasoning
whatsoever to support the distinction. It also allows some plaintiffs to proceed to discovery even if they do not have access to all of the relevant facts
supporting their claims at the pleading stage.

statement involves terms that double as elements of the cause of action, while the former do not. Rather,
the former allegations implicate the defendants’ actual roles in the events that unfolded in the wake of
the September 11 attacks. If we borrow Professor Steinman’s “transactional” definition of a
nonconclusory allegation—one that describes the overt and visible aspects of the real-world events
underlying the dispute—these allegations seem to be factual, rather than legal. Steinman, supra note 26,
at 1334. Justice Souter, writing in dissent, agreed that these statements are nonconclusory. See Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166
Bone, supra note 15, at 861 (“There is no obvious way to draw a line along the generalityspecificity continuum, and the Iqbal majority offers nothing to guide the analysis in a sensible way.”);
see also Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 566 (“The problem is that one person’s ‘conclusion’ is another
person’s ‘fact.’”).
167
Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 492–93 (2010)
(“Put somewhat differently, what is ‘conclusory’ depends on the right of action on which the claimant
seeks relief and the conclusions that are necessary to relief under that right of action.”).
168
Bone, supra note 15, at 861.
169
See id. at 864 (“Inspired by the legal realist critique and committed to liberalizing pleading
practice, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated the code distinction between
facts and legal conclusions.”).
170
Hartnett, supra note 167, at 492–93.
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C. Popularity of Common Sense Gloss on Plausibility
Thus far, the data show that lower courts have mostly ignored the existence of the Iqbal test and that even the courts who cited it did not rigorously apply its first prong. When faced with the combination of this data
and the wealth of scholarly criticism of the decision, one might think that
Ashcroft v. Iqbal is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on the
Twombly version of the plausibility standard.
The third question of this Note’s empirical study focuses on the Iqbal
Court’s substantive clarification of the contours of the plausibility standard.
The decision itself offers two equally viable definitions of plausibility: the
checklist approach and the common sense gloss.171 The study found that not
only do more lower courts seem to prefer the common sense gloss to the
checklist approach but that this gloss has attained widespread acceptance
across the circuits. Overall, 68% of the cases cited the common sense
gloss, as compared to 33% that cited the checklist approach. Moreover, in
every circuit except the Third, at least 60% of the cases cited to one or both
of the statements embodying the common sense gloss.172
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF CHECKLIST APPROACH AND COMMON SENSE
GLOSS BY CIRCUIT (BY PERCENTAGE)
All Circuits
1st Circuit
2nd Circuit
3rd Circuit
4th Circuit
5th Circuit
6th Circuit
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In retrospect, these findings do not seem particularly surprising considering that judges are certainly accustomed to using their experience to draw
reasonable inferences from sets of facts. In fact, judges do so every time
171

See supra Part II.C.
The Appendix to this Note, infra, contains two tables detailing the precise number of times each
of the four statements was cited.
172
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they decide a “hard case” for which there are no precedents directly on
point. But Iqbal, and to a lesser extent, Twombly, represent the first time
that the Supreme Court has declined to impose a rigid (or rigid-sounding)
pleading standard and instead explicitly asked the lower courts to intuit the
existence of wrongdoing. Twombly certainly moved in this direction by
killing the hyperbolic “no set of facts” language and by examining the facts
in light of “common economic experience.”173
Iqbal pushed the standard a little further, explicitly allowing judges to
account for context when deciding whether a claim is plausible. The common sense gloss echoes Professor Stephen Burbank’s suspicion that the
ambiguity of the Twombly opinion might have been strategically designed
to empower lower courts to vary pleading requirements based on perceived
differences in substantive contexts.174 The Iqbal common sense gloss on
plausibility, particularly when read in isolation from the two-pronged test,
can be interpreted to do just that.
Of course, as more skeptical commentators have pointed out, widespread application of such a gloss could send pleading standards careening
off the cliff of absolute subjectivity.175 Some scholars fear that judges will
interpret the common sense gloss as a license to apply heightened pleading
standards, particularly in those areas of substantive law that necessarily entail costly and time-consuming discovery or occupy a large percentage of
the federal docket.176 Too flexible a pleading standard could allow judges
effectively to bar the doors to the courthouse, frustrating the enforcement of
entire areas of substantive law. Taken to the extreme, a pleading standard
based entirely on the presiding judge’s common sense might prevent litigants from being able to determine ex ante what level of factual sufficiency
they will have to provide to survive a motion to dismiss.
At this point, it is impossible to tell what, if any, effect the widespread
application of the common sense gloss will have on pleading practice. To
be sure, we do not yet have much empirical data on dismissal rates after
Iqbal. The limited data analyzed thus far, however, indicate little overall
change in the number of complaints dismissed without leave to amend.177
Interestingly, Professor Hatamyar’s study noted a dramatic post-Iqbal jump
in the number of complaints dismissed with leave to amend, which suggests
173

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 (2007).
Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535,
553–54.
175
Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, LITIGATION, Spring 2009, at 1,
2.
176
See Bone, supra note 15, at 878–79 (noting that the dismissal rates of civil rights claims and
other cases involving state-of-mind elements have disproportionately increased under Iqbal); Seiner,
supra note 59, at 1015 (arguing that employment discrimination cases should be reviewed under a special pleading standard that would relieve the often-insurmountable burden created by the two-pronged
Iqbal test).
177
See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 75, at 598 tbl.1.
174
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that courts are allowing litigants greater opportunity to adapt to this new
standard.178
Judicial “common sense” is a flexible notion, potentially subject to influence by persuasive advocates. Twombly can also be read as inviting attorneys to present information to change the judge’s opinion of what is
standard business practice and what is not.179 Thus, while the common
sense standard almost certainly frustrates attorneys by precluding any precise rule governing the factual sufficiency of complaints, it can also be interpreted as empowering both lower courts and plaintiffs.
Common sense also provides for flexibility across various areas of
substantive law, allowing judges to adjust the specific requirements, or even
the standards themselves, according to the specific elements of the alleged
claim.180 As such, courts can adjust requirements for cases in which plaintiffs don’t have access to the facts or in cases alleging a state of mind.
Moreover, judges with different life experiences might view plausibility
differently than other judges based on their own perceptions of what is reasonable, natural, and commonplace.181 This potential divergence of opinions gives plaintiffs whose claims are dismissed at the trial level a modicum
of hope in an appeal; the judges on an appellate panel might have a different
baseline for their common sense and thus might reach a different conclusion.
CONCLUSION
This Note undertook a preliminary evaluation of district courts’ interpretations of the federal pleading standard after Iqbal. The results revealed
that, far from creating a uniform standard, Iqbal has functioned as a judicial
Rorschach test, allowing individual judges to pick and choose various dicta
to create widely divergent pleading standards. The study found that relatively few (less than 50%) of district courts have applied the two-pronged
test suggested in Iqbal. Even fewer courts (approximately 50% of the
courts that cited the test) rigorously applied both of its prongs. By far, the
most popular interpretation of this inkblot of a standard has been a holistic
approach that rejects formal categories and adopts a common sense gloss on
the substantive meaning of “plausibility.”
178

Id. at 600.
Hartnett, supra note 167, at 500. Professor Hartnett notes that in Twombly itself, the Court
relied on the particular history of the telecommunications industry to determine whether the plaintiffs’
allegations were plausible. Id. at 501.
180
Id. at 496–97 (noting that plausibility is easier to find in claims of negligence involving car
accidents or claims of deliberate indifference involving denial of medical treatment than in antitrust).
181
Id. at 499. Professor Hartnett notes that four of the five Justices who joined the Iqbal majority
had experience in the Executive Branch. Of the four dissenting Justices, only one, Justice Breyer, had
such experience, and his federal executive experience included service as a special Watergate
prosecutor. Id. at 500. Professor Hartnett then suggests that these experiences shaped the relevant
Justices’ “common sense” understanding of what is “natural” for a high-level federal executive. Id.
179
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The two-pronged Iqbal test and the Court’s “reasonable inference”
dicta are somewhat strange bedfellows. The former is mechanistic and
rigid, requiring judges to carefully parse complaints to determine which allegations merit further analysis. The latter is fluid, contextual, respectful of
the fact that judges have ruled on tens, hundreds, maybe thousands of these
motions and likely have a finely tuned radar for identifying complaints for
which discovery is likely to uncover supporting evidence. In retrospect, it
seems to be no surprise at all that so many judges have used this language
in their opinions.
The danger is that the language of the Iqbal opinion sweeps so broadly
that it can potentially lead to widely divergent interpretations based on the
judge or judges charged with applying the decision. This potential for divergent standards makes empirical work like this study absolutely critical
because only empirical work can help scholars and judges see how the decision is being interpreted—and how pleading standards are being framed—at
the ground level. It also helps litigants to make informed choices on
whether to challenge the factual sufficiency of complaints or even whether
to bring complaints at all.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 2: CASES CITING CHECKLIST APPROACH BY CIRCUIT
Total
Cases

Cited
MTU182

Cited
FW183

Cited
Both

Cited
One

Overall

159

36

20

4

48

1st Circuit

8

3

0

0

3

2nd Circuit

25

7

4

1

9

3rd Circuit

21

3

2

1

3

4th Circuit

11

4

1

0

5

5th Circuit

12

5

4

1

7

6th Circuit

13

3

2

0

5

7th Circuit

14

2

0

0

2

8th Circuit

5

1

1

0

2

9th Circuit

26

6

4

1

8

10th Circuit

8

0

2

0

2

11th Circuit

12

2

0

0

2

D.C. Circuit

4

0

0

0

0

182

MTU referrs to the “more than an unadorned . . . accusation” gloss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“[Rule 8] demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.”); supra Part III.C.
183
FW refers to the “framework” gloss. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”); supra Part III.C.
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TABLE 3: CASES CITING COMMON SENSE GLOSS BY CIRCUIT

Total
Cases

Cited
RI184

Cited
CS185

Cited
Both

Cited One

All Circuits

159

91

51

34

74

1st Circuit

8

2

4

1

4

2nd Circuit

25

13

10

8

7

3rd Circuit

21

11

1

1

10

4th Circuit

11

10

5

5

5

5th Circuit

12

9

4

3

7

6th Circuit

13

7

5

3

6

7th Circuit

14

9

1

0

10

8th Circuit

5

2

2

1

2

9th Circuit

26

12

6

2

14

10th Circuit

8

5

6

4

3

11th Circuit

12

7

6

5

3

D.C. Circuit

4

4

1

1

3

184

RI refers to the “reasonable inference” gloss. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (2009) (“A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); supra Part III.C.
185
CS refers to the “context-specific” gloss. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”); supra Part III.C.
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